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A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE
"GENERAL WELFARE"
The city of Livermore was oned a small community located in the
Livermore-Amador Valley of Central California. Following World
War IT, the population increased eightfold within a twenty-year-
span, reaching 37,703 in 1970. This massive influx of new residents
overwhelmed the local school, sewage, and water facilities.' When
the Livermore city council refused to limit new growth, the resi-
dents passed an initiative in 19722 which prohibited further resi-
dential building until local school, sewage, and water facilities met
specified standards. A local construction association sued to enjoin
enforcement of the initiative.
1. For a discussion of the background to the Livermore initiative, see
Deutsch, Land Use Growth Controls: A Case Study of San Jose and Liver-
more, California, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1, 12-15 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Deutsch].
2. The Livermore Initiative, Apr. 11, 1972, provides as follows:
INITIATIVE ORDINANCE RE BUILDING PERMITS
An ordinance to control residential building permits in the City of
Livermore:
A. The people of the City of Livermore hereby find and declare
that it is in the best interest of the City in order to protect
the health, safety, and general welfare of the citizens of the
city, to control residential building permits in the said city.
Residential building permits include single-family residential,
multiple residential, and trailer court building permits within
the meaning of the City Code of Livermore and the General
Plan of Livermore. Additionally, it is the purpose of this in-
itiative measure to contribute to the solution of air pollution
in the City of Livermore.
B. The specific reasons for the proposed position are that the
undersigned believe that the resulting impact from issuing
residential building permits at the current rate results in the
following problems mentioned below. Therefore, no further
residential permits are to be issued by the said city until satis-
factory solutions, as determined in the standards set forth, exist
to all the following problems:
1. EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES-No double sessions in the
schools nor overcrowded classrooms as determined by the
California Education Code.
2. SEWAGE-The sewage treatment facilities and capacities
meet the standards set by the Regional Water Quality
Control Board.
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The California Supreme Court, in Associated Home Builders of
the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore,3 recently followed
the rapidly emerging national trend4 toward a regional perspective
in the judicial review of exclusionary zoning. The supreme court
held that a zoning ordinance having significant regional impact
must bear a reasonable relation to the welfare of the region's
citizens.5 The test formulated in the Livermore decision examined
the effect of the zoning on the region. The decision held that the
local legislature may no longer consider the effect of its ordinance
within the municipal boundaries alone. Now it must also consider
whether its ordinance has a significant effect upon the larger
region outside the municipality.
The zoning process has been developing for the past fifty years
while the judicial standard of review has remained static. The
Livermore decision marked a profound shift in the California judi-
cial standard of review. It brought the California constitutional
standard up to date, enabling it to deal with the consequences of
fifty years 6 of urban and zoning evolution.
The constitutional test of a zoning ordinance since Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 7 and Miller v. Board of Public Works,8
has required that the ordinance bear a rational relation to the
health, safety, and general welfare of the community. The applica-
tion of the test traditionally involved two related corollaries. First,
courts deferred to the local judgment.9 Second, the "general wel-
3. WATER SUPPLY-No rationing of water with respect to
human consumption or irrigation and adequate water re-
serves for fire protection exist.
C. This ordinance may only be amended or repealed by the voters
at a regular municipal election.
D. If any portion of this ordinance is declared invalid the remain-
ing portions are to be considered valid.
3. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
4. See text accompanying notes 41-44 infra.
5. 18 Cal. 3d at 607, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55. For the court's
holding in the instant case, see text accompanying note 109 infra.
6. More than half a century ago, Mr. Justice Holmes remarked in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), that "[t]he general
rule . . . is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The question
thus arose: How far is too far? In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 392 (1926), the Supreme Court held that the municipality's
regulation must bear a "rational relation to the health, morals, safety and
general welfare of the community." Accord, Miller v. Board of Pub. Works,
195 CaL 477, 234 P. 381 (1925).
7. 372 U.S. 365 (1926). Euclid established the nationwide validity of
zoning regulation.
8. 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925). Miller established the validity of zon-
ing regulation in California.
9. Note, General Welfare and "No-Growth" Zoning Plans: Considera-
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fare" was defined in local terms. 10 The judiciary gave little sub-
stantive consideration to a zoning ordinance under these traditional
corollaries."
The Livermore decision purported to adopt the regional perspec-
tive of the general welfare by extending traditional principles. 12
tion of Regional Needs by Local Authorities, 26 CASE W.L. REV. 215, 220
n.17 (1975); Comment, Exclusionary Zoning: An Overview, 47 TUL. L. REV.
1056, 1060 n.32 (1972).
California courts, in compliance with the traditional rule, have been de-
ferential to the local legislatures. Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal. 2d 776,
382 P.2d 375, 31 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1963); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City
of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962); Lock-
ard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 38 (1949); Town of
Los Altos Hills v. Adobe Creek Properties, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 3d 488, 508-09,
108 Cal. Rptr. 271, 286-87 (1973), and cases therein cited.
10. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 110, 341 N.E.2d 236,
242, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 681 (1975); Note, General Welfare and "No-Growth"
Zoning Plans: Consideration of Regional Needs by Local Authorities, 26
CASE W.L. REv. 215, 221, n.28; Comment, Exclusionary Zoning: An Over-
view, 47 TUL. L. REv. 1056, 1062 (1973). See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974), in which the Supreme Court found a rational
basis in the community's desire for a pleasant environment.
11. See Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 38
(1949). The California court first enunciated the usual standards-that is,
that an ordinance must be "reasonable in object and not arbitrary in opera-
tion," id. at 460, 202 P.2d at 42, and that the court will not consider the wis-
dom of the legislative act, id. at 461, 202 P.2d at 43. Then the court moved
beyond deference into the area of indifference: The ordinance will not be
set aside unless "clearly wrong" and the error must appear "beyond reason-
able doubt from facts or evidence which cannot be controverted." Id. This
standard of review appears even less exacting than minimal scrutiny.
The Lockard facts involved an appeal from a trial court decision finding
that a city ordinance was arbitrary and discriminatory. The California
court held that "[tihe findings and conclusions of the trial court as to the
reasonableness of a zoning ordinance are not binding on an appellate court
if the record shows that the question is debatable and that there may be a
difference of opinion on the subject." Id. at 462, 202 P.2d at 43. Logically,
this non-binding character of the trial findings means that so long as there
is any evidence to substantiate the ordinance in the face of an attack on its
validity, the ordinance can be upheld on appeal. "Similarly, findings which
relate to matters of opinion and judgment, such as that property is 'suitable
only' for certain purposes, are not controlling." Id. The supreme court
restricted the function of the jury to weigh and to judge the evidence. If
the appellate court does not agree with the trial findings, the appellate court
may substitute its own findings in zoning cases. In his dissent, Justice
Carter argues that the Lockard majority calls for appellate courts to
become trial tribunals. He points out that the credibility of evidence is
to be determined at the trial. Id. at 469, 202 P.2d at 47.
12. See text accompanying note 88 infra.
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It sought to extend the scope of the "general welfare" while con-
tinuing to defer to local judgment.
To apply the Euclid test with a regional perspective, a court must
reverse each of the two traditional corollaries. The judiciary can-
not adopt a regional perspective while deferring to a parochial view
of the "general welfare." First, courts may not defer to, but must
actively 3 review the effect of the local judgment. Second, the
"general welfare" must be defined in regional terms. The Liver-
more court adopted both new corollaries to the constitutional test.
It explicitly took a regional view of the general welfare and implic-
itly required active review of local zoning legislation.
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the Livermore decision
and its constitutional basis, to locate the decision within the frame-
work of the national judicial trend toward regional review, and to
illustrate why the judiciary has started, and must continue, toward
a regional standard. This Comment advocates the regional per-
spective of the "general welfare" as a device to avoid the exclusion-
ary results of judicial deference, 14 without calling upon the courts
to become legislatures.
This Comment will first establish the zoning background to
illustrate the changed circumstances that now mandate active
regional review. The national precedents, requiring a regional
perspective, will then be reviewed to elucidate the wide range of
approaches manifested within that perspective. The Livermore
decision then will be analyzed with reference to the national
precedents.
BACKGROUND
The principle of judicial deference was derived from a common
concern of landowners,15 local legislatures,'0 and courts" for sta-
13. Berenson and Livermore are examples of active judicial review. See
text accompanying notes 65 & 126 infra. See the cases cited in notes 41-43
infra as examples of aggressive judicial review.
14. See text accompanying notes 15-39 infra.
15. R. BABcocK, THm ZoNING GAME 4 (1966).
16. Municipalities were eager to stabilize land values. Dukeminier,
Boards of Readjustment: The Problem Re-Examined, 14 ZONING DIG. 361,
364 (1962).
17. The United States Supreme Court was also concerned with order and
stability. The Court saw ill-regulated property in terms of nuisance law.
"A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place-like a pig
in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). "[T]he law of nuisances . . . may be con-
sulted. . . to aid ... in the process of ascertaining the scope of the [police]
power." Id. at 387-88.
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bility in land use and value. Once the courts labeled the local deci-
sion as legislative, the constitutional principle of separation of
powers limited judicial review of zoning.18 The separation of
powers principle served to reinforce judicial deference to local
legislatures.
The original Euclidean' 9 zoning separated different land uses into
different use districts.20 The Euclid ordinance barred particular
uses from specified areas. The resultant exclusion was indirect at
most. When a court deferred to a Euclidean zoning plan it was not
deferring to a directly exclusionary practice.
Following World War II municipalities began experimenting
with new means to cope with the demands of urban expansion.
Established residents began to question the value of growth, dis-
playing a "new mood" 21 to deny further growth and preserve the
status quo. Local legislatures imposed lot size2 2 and structure
23
requirements. Some ordinances discriminated against the im-
migration of identifiable groups.24 The more recent growth con-
18. The California Supreme Court in Lockard held that the doctrine of
separation of powers requires deference to the legislative prerogative. 33
Cal. 2d at 461, 202 P.2d at 43. "Implicit in such a philosophy of judicial
self-restraint is the growing awareness that matters of land use and devel-
opment are peculiarly within the expertise of students of city and suburban
planning, and thus well within the legislative prerogative, not lightly to
he impeded." Golden v. Planning Bd., (Ramapo), 30 N.Y.2d 359, 376-77,
285 N.E.2d 291, 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 151, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003
(1972). Significantly, recent decisions calling for a regional zoning per-
spective do not mention separation of powers: Associated Home Builders
of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d
473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Berenson v. Town
of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975); In re
Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
19. Euclidean is a zoning term coined with reference to the national
zoning precedent of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926).
20. Id. at 380.
21. Reilly, New Directions in Federal Land Use Legislation, 1973 URB. L.
ANN. 29, 56 (1973); Comment, Exclusionary Zoning: An Overview, 47 TUL.
L. REV. 1056, 1056 (1972).
22. Senior v. Zoning Comm'n, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959), appeal
dismissed, 363 U.S. 143 (1960) (four-acre minimum lot size); Fischer v.
Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952) (five-acre mini-
mum lot size).
23. Note, Zoning: Setback Lines: A Reappraisal, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV.
739, 740 (1969).
24. Some growth control ordinances exclude particular types of resi-
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trol plans,2 5 however, are non-discriminatory, excluding 26 all new
growth that exceeds specified limits. 27
Whereas Euclidean zoning only indirectly affected the number
of residents in an area, lot size restrictions, performance standards
plans, and other growth control systems have been expressly de-
signed to deny new growth.28  The indirect exclusion of Euclidean
plans has given way to direct exclusion of newcomers.
Commentators have discussed the problems of increased cost 20
and inadequate quality and supply of housing 3° that result from
exclusionary zoning practices. These problems are felt throughout
the region.31 "[M]unicipalities are not islands remote from the
dential uses, such as multi-family dwellings, apartments, or apartments with
more than one bedroom. Courts tend to see these as disguised forms of
exclusion. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (only detached single-family dwellings
were allowed); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d
236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (multi-family resi-
dential uses were excluded); In re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970)
(apartments, in effect, were excluded.)
25. For a discussion of the various types of growth controls, see STAN-
FORD ENVIRON. L. Soc., A HANDBOOK FOR CONTROLLING LOCAL GROWTH Ch.
IV (1973); Deutsch, supra note 1, at 8.
26. Exclusion is defined in the text accompanying note 136 infra.
27. The Petaluma Plan fixed an annual new housing construction limit
at 500 units in the urban core of the City of Petaluma. Construction Indus.
Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 901 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). The Livermore Plan, supra note
2, excludes all new housing construction until city facilities are available.
The Ramapo Plan similarly was a performance-standards plan. Permission
to develop was tied to "[tJhe availability . . . of five essential facilities or
services: (1) public sanitary sewers... ; (2) drainage facilities; (3) im-
proved public parks or recreational facilities, including public schools; (4)
State, county or town roads... ; (5) firehouses. .. ." Golden v. Planning
Bd. (Ramapo), 30 N.Y.2d 359, 368, 285 N.E.2d 291, 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138,
143-44, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). For a discussion of per-
formance standards as a land use tool, see McDougal, Performance Stand-
ards: A Viable Alternative to Euclidean Zoning?, 47 TUL. L. REv. 255 (1973).
28. Deutsch, supra note 1, at 2.
29. Large lot and floor space requirements increase the cost of housing.
One court found that such restrictions established a minimum price of$45,000 in 1971. "Only those with incomes in the top 10% of the nation
and county could finance new housing in [the zone concerned]." 283 A.2d
353, 356 (N.J. Super. 1971). See Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo
Pass a Law to Bind the Rights of the Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
234, 245-'50 (1973), for a discussion of the increased cost of housing result-
ing from development timing controls.
30. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection,
and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 781-82 (1969).
31. Construction Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522
F.2d 897, 908 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). The
Petaluma court recognized an exclusionary purpose and the regional effect
of the ordinance, but refused to take it upon itself to find a due process
1232
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needs and problems of the area in which they are located; thus an
ordinance, superficially reasonable from the limited viewpoint of
the municipality, may be disclosed as unreasonable when viewed
from a larger perspective."32 Consequently, the developing munici-
pality is faced with a dilemma. The power to zone is delegated to
the local legislature,3 3 but the pre-eminent problem of growth tran-
scends its jurisdictional boundaries. 34
The extra-territorial effect of local zoning legislation now requires
active judicial review to assure compliance with the regional wel-
fare.3G Judicial deference to the local legislature is not justified
under the principle of separation of powers.36 It is, of course, en-
violation "merely because a local entity exercises in its own self-interest
the police power lawfully delegated to it by the state." Id. at 908. The
New York Court of Appeals in Ramapo declared that there is "something
inherently suspect in a scheme which, apart from its professed purposes,
effects a restriction upon the free mobility of a people until sometime in
the future when projected facilities are available." The court, however,
called upon the state legislature to require regional planning. Golden v.
Planning Bd. (Ramapo), 30 N.Y.2d 359, 375, 285 N.E.2d 291, 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d
138, 149, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). This court later extricated
itself from its dilemma in Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102,
341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975). See text accompanying note 65
infra.
32. Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 607, 557 P.2d 473, 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 55 (1976).
"[N]early all the 'controlled growth' communities (Boulder, Colo., Boca
Raton, Fla., Ramapo, N.Y., Petaluma, Cal., and Fairfax County, Va.) are
functional parts of a metropolitan economy." R. HEALY, LAND UsE AND ME
STATES 13 n.9 (1976). See also Walsh, Are Local Zoning Bodies Required
by the Constitution to Consider Regional Needs?, 3 CONN. L. REv. 244, 245
(1971).
33. See text accompanying note 141 infra.
34. R. HEALY, LAND USE AND THE STATES 8 (1976).
35. See Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Law and Democratic
Living, 20 LAW & CoNTE1m. PROB. 317, 318 (1955) (calls on judiciary to
"watch over" parochial and exclusionist local governments); The Supreme
Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REV. 41, 128 (1974) (critical of the Supreme
Court's implication that as a general rule it will be deferential in reviewing
zoning cases.); Note, General Welfare and "No-Growth" Zoning Plans: Con-
sideration of Regional Needs by Local Authorities, 26 CASE W.L. REV. 215,
238 n.104 (1975).
36. In Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 580, 507 P.2d
23, 26 (1973), the Oregon Supreme Court said:
[W]e would be ignoring reality to rigidly view all zoning decis-
ions by local governing bodies as legislative acts to be accorded
a full presumption of validity and shielded from less than constitu-
tional scrutiny by the theory of separation of powers. Local and
1233
tirely appropriate for the Supreme Court to defer to a Congressional
judgment. However, it does not logically follow from this prin-
ciple that the Supreme Court or a state supreme court must also
defer to a local legislature.3 7 Yet some courts, including the
Supreme Court, continue to defer to local legislative judgments that
are parochial 38 and exclusionary. 39
small decision groups are simply not the equivalent in all respects
of state and national legislatures.
In practice, some judges have been unwilling to accord deference to the
local body. In R. BABcocK, THE ZONING GAME (1966), the author states:
This lack of confidence in legislative responsibility, particularly
when exercised by small political units, seems most evident in
those judges who have come up through local politics. A state sup-
preme court justice told me he decided at least one well-noted case
against the municipality because he simply could not accept the
view that officials of a small government unit were capable of ex-
ercising fairness where decisions on land use-matters required con-
siderable discretion.
Id. at 105.
37. STAN. ENVIRON. L. Soc., A HANDBOOK FOR CONTROLLING LOCAL
GROWTH 13 (1973):
[L]egislative deference is most justified when it is granted to Con-
gress, as Congressmen are responsive to a wide-ranging public, and
must balance several competing points of view. Zoning and other
growth control regulations have traditionally been characterized as
legislative decisions which the courts ought to defer to; however,
as one slides down the scale from Congress, to the State Legisla-
ture, to the City Council, and to the planning commission, it is
questionable whether the factors that normally justify legislative
deference are still in operation. Generally, the smaller the deci-
sion-making body, the smaller the representation of varying politi-
cal views, and the greater the chance for action which is arbitrary
and discriminatorily narrow in scope.
38. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (the
Court found a rational relation in the community's desire for a quiet envi-
ronment. But see note 145 infra.); Construction Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma
County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 934 (1976); Golden v. Planning Bd. (Ramapo), 30 N.Y.2d 359, 375, 285
N.E.2d 291, 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 149, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972)(the New York Court of Appeals deferred to a local plan that restricted
land use for up to 18 years despite the court's suggestion that there is
"something inherently suspect" about the scheme). Ramapo's precise status
is in doubt in light of Berenson which specifically called upon municipalities
to consider the needs of the region (see text accompanying note 71 infra)
while it also approved of Ramapo (see text accompanying note 70 infra).
In Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 600, 350
N.E.2d 381, 389, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 13 (1976), the New York Court of Appeals
cited Ramapo in a string cite. See also Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of
Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 961 (1st Cir. 1972) (upheld three- and six-acre
minimum lot size restrictions).
39. In Construction Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma,
375 F. Supp. 574, 580-81 (N.D. Cal. 1974), the district court found that
the Petaluma Plan had an exclusionary purpose and that if it was adopted
throughout the San Francisco Bay area, the region would experience a
shortage of 105,000 units in the decade of 1970 to 1980. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit did not directly question these findings. 522 F.2d 897, 906 (9th Cir.
1975). However, the court of appeals felt it could not actively scrutinize
1234
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A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Precedents to the Livermore Decision
Several jurisdictions have adopted the regional perspective of the
"general welfare. '40 They are Virginia,41 Pennsylvania, 42 New
Jersey,43 and New York.44 The Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New
Jersey Supreme Courts aggressively review exclusionary zoning
ordinances. 45 These three courts do not balance the demands upon
the municipality against the needs of the region for housing.46
the Petaluma Plan without becoming a super-zoning board. Id. at 908.
But see note 119 and accompanying text infra.
40. The Michigan court of appeals adopted a regional zoning rule. Bris-
tow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971). How-
ever, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled this decision in Kropf v. City
of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974).
41. Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390
(1959). The Virginia Court modified Carper in Board of Supervisors v. De-
Groff Enterprises, Inc., 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973). It said the effect
of Carper "is to prohibit socio-economic zoning"-that is, a municipality may
not exclude or include any particular socio-economic group. This latter
decision seems to call into question the continuing vitality of Virginia's re-
gional perspective, since the regional concern of Carper was to provide for
low income housing. However, the Virginia Supreme Court continues to
be concerned with the regional housing need and has recognized the con-
tinued validity of the Carper decision. See Board of Supervisors v. Allman,
215 Va. 434, 211 S.E.2d 48 (1975).
42. In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); In re
Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn,
419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
43. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
44. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
45. In Virginia the supreme court will reconsider the facts and review
the trial findings to discover the implicit purpose of the local legislation.
Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
The supreme court in Pennsylvania will substitute its judgment for the
local legislature's judgment of an adequate lot size. The court found that
a one-acre lot would be adequate for a house since "[tihe Kaufman's De-
partment store in Pittsburgh is built on approximately a one-acre lot."
See In re Kit-Mar Builders Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 471 n.4, 268 A.2d 765, 767
n.4 (1970).
The New Jersey case concerned a zoning plan that made no provision
for low income housing. The supreme court found that the Township
of Mount Laurel is motivated by "selfish" and "parochial" interests.
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 171, 336 A.2d 713, 723,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
46. The courts focus on whether an exclusionary purpose is present in
1235
Pennsylvania and New Jersey hold the need for housing para-
mount.4 7 Virginia recently adopted a unique rule that finds a
taking of private property when low income housing is excluded or
included in a zoning plan.48
The New Jersey Supreme Court offers the most strident repudia-
tion of local motives in NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel.4"1
Rather than accepting the traditional discretion granted to local
legislatures, the supreme court stated the local legislature has a
''presumptive obligation" to consider a "broader view of the general
welfare." 50 At three points in its opinion, the court said the local
legislature has an affirmative obligation to make available a variety
and choice of housing."' The court in Mount Laurel spoke to a
state-wide, extreme pattern of exclusion.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently modified the Mount
Laurel holding to require that the local legislature make available
the local zoning legislation. Once a court finds such a purpose, the ordi-
nance is invalid. See Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653,
661, 107 S.E.2d 390, 396 (1959).
47. See National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 527-28, 215 A.2d
597, 610 (1965) (citations omitted):
Zoning is a tool in the hands of governmental bodies which enables
them to more effectively meet the demands of evolving and grow-
ing communities. It must not and can not be used by those officials
as an instrument by which they may shirk their responsibilities.
Zoning is a means by which a governmental body can plan for the
future-it may not be used as a means to deny the future....
Zoning provisions may not be used ... to avoid the increased re-
sponsibilities and economic burdens which time and natural growth
invariably bring.
The municipality in In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. argued that its two- and
three-acre minimum lot sizes were authorized by the Pennsylvania enabling
legislation. The majority rejected this argument and found that the pur-
pose of the lot size restriction was to prevent newcomers from making addi-
tional demands on city facilities. 439 Pa. at 474 n.6, 268 A.2d at 768 n.6.
Justice Jones, in his dissenting opinion, indicated that the enabling legisla-
tion could be construed to authorize zoning on the basis of a sewage prob-
lem. Id. at 484, 268 A.2d at 773. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10604 (1972) sets
forth the authorized purposes of zoning legislation. The statute provides in
pertinent part: "The provisions of zoning ordinances shall be designed: (1)
To promote, protect and facilitate one or more of the following: . . .sew-
erage . . . as well as (2) To prevent one or more of the following: ...
other dangers."
The New Jersey Supreme Court is concerned that the local legislatures
provide for low income housing. See text accompanying note 56 infra.
But see Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, No. A-80/81,
slip op. at 81-84 (N.J. Jan. 26, 1977) (environmental impact is relevant to
zoning considerations).
48. Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises, Inc., 214 Va. 235, 198
S.E.2d 600 (1973).
49. 67 N.J. 151, 171, 336 A.2d 713, 723, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
50. Id. at 179, 336 A.2d at 728.
51. Id. at 174, 179, 187, 336 A.2d at 724, 728, 731.
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the "least cost" housing, rather than low income housing.52 The
nonavailability of federal funds for subsidized low income housing
rendered the Mount Laurel decision hollow.53 Land zoned for low
income housing remained vacant.54 Thus, the court held that the
local legislature must fulfill its obligation to provide for its fair
share of the regional lower income housing need by zoning for
the least cost housing that private industry will build.55
The supreme courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey shift the
burden of proof to the zoning proponent in certain circumstances.
The Mount Laurel opinion held that when the zoning opponent in
New Jersey demonstrates that a developing municipality has not,
by its zoning laws, made possible a variety and choice of housing,
including low and moderate income housing, he has made a prima
facie showing of a violation of substantive due process or equal pro-
tection under the state constitution.56 A "heavy burden" then shifts
to the local legislature to establish a valid basis for its action or non-
action.5 7 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in shifting the burden,
goes further than any other court in the nation to require the local
legislature to justify its exclusion of low and moderate income
housing. 58 In Pennsylvania, the burden shifts when a zoning ordi-
52. Oakwood at Madison v. Township of Madison, No. A-80/81, slip op.
at 37 (N.J. Jan. 26, 1977).
53. Id. at 33-37. The court notes that some suspended federal programs
have been replaced. Id. at 34 n.20. Query whether a sudden availability
of federal low income housing funds will call for another change in the
New Jersey constitutional mandate?
54. In January 1973, President Nixon impounded the federally subsidized
housing funds (id. at 34 n.20) and private industry would not proceed
unaided to build low income housing. Id. at 35.
55. Id. at 36. The resolution of what is to be the "fair share" of the com-
munity is a legislative, not judicial, determination. Id. at 78. The supreme
court suggests that least-cost housing will not provide new housing for low
income people but that they will be indirectly assisted by a "filtering
down" process-that is, the effect of a presumed greater supply of new
housing will make available used low income housing. Id. at 38.
56. 67 N.J. at 181-82, 336 A.2d at 728. The burden continued to shift un-
der the Oakwood at Madison decision when the plaintiff made a "prima
facie" case of exclusion.
57. Id. at 181, 336 A.2d at 728.
58. In California, under the Livermore rule, once the zoning opponent
established (1) a regional effect and (2) regional exclusion, he has only
made out a prima facie case. See text accompanying notes 99 & 100 infra.
In New Jersey the opponent need only have the allegation of exclusion of
low and moderate income housing in his complaint remain unrefuted to
shift the burden of proof to the proponent of the local legislation. For an
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nance totally bans a legitimate business.50
Prior to adopting the regional perspective, the above states varied
in their acceptance of the traditional corollaries 0 to constitutional
review of land use regulation. Pennsylvania and New York for-
merly adhered to both traditional corollaries, viewing the "general
welfare" in local terms and deferring to the local land-use deci-
sion.0 ' New Jersey has considered the "general welfare" in broad
terms for almost thirty years,6 2 but chose to defer to the local judg-
ment until its Mount Laurel decision. 3  Virginia adopted the
regional perspective early in 1959.04
Berenson v. Town of New Castle,0 5 a New York decision, offers a
middle ground between deference to the local definition of general
welfare 66 and invalidation of all ordinances found to have an ex-
clusionary purpose or effect. 67 The Berenson ordinance excluded
multi-family residential housing and required one- and two-acre
minimum lot sizes.0 8 Berenson is the only regional zoning precedent
example of such a shift in a Pennsylvania case see Beaver Gasoline Co.
v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 445 Pa. 571, 577, 285 A.2d 501, 504-05 (1971).
59. Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 445 Pa. 571, 576, 285 A.2d
501, 503-04 (1971) (involving the total ban of gasoline service stations).
60. For a statement of the traditional corollaries, see text accompanying
notes 9 & 10 supra.
61. Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 72, 141 A.2d
851, 855 (1958) (court deferred to the local definition of general welfare).
But cf. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 532, 215 A.2d 597, 612
(1965) (ordinances may not deny the entrance of newcomers in order to
avoid the increased demands they would make upon city facilities).
The New York Court of Appeals in Golden v. Planning Bd. (Ramapo),
30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
1003 (1972), deferred, with some hesitance, to the local outline of the gen-
eral welfare.
62. In Duffcon Concrete Prod., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509,
513, 64 A.2d 347, 349-50 (1949), the New Jersey Supreme Court said, in dic-
tum, that the definition of "appropriate use" depends on the conditions pre-
vailing in the region. See also Kunzler v. Hoffman, 48 N.J. 277, 225 A.2d
321 (1966).
63. Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693
(1952) (New Jersey Supreme Court upheld minimum floor space restric-
tions). In Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J.
Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971), a New Jersey court held that regional needs
should be considered by the local legislature, citing generally DeSimone v.
Greater Englewood Housing Corp., 56 N.J. 428, 267 A.2d 31 (1970), and Duff-
con Concrete Prod., Inc. v. Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
64. Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 661, 107 S.E.2d
390, 396 (1959), which cited as authority Simon v. Town of Needham, 311
Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942).
65. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
66. The Petaluma decision is offered as an example of a deferential court.
See note 31 supra.
67. See cases cited in note 45 supra.
68. 38 N.Y.2d at 105, 341 N.E.2d at 239, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
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that purports to make allowance for some measure of exclusion in
local zoning legislation. In this respect, it is similar to Livermore. 9
The New York Court of Appeals faced a dilemma in Berenson.
It acknowledged Golden v. Planning Board (Ramapo"0 ) in so far
as Ramapo provided for a balanced community, but the court also
wanted to put that balanced community into a regional perspec-
tive.71 The Ramapo decision upheld the local ordinance.7 2  The
Berenson decision found that the exclusion of multi-family housing
could be so substantial that it would be unconstitutional, and
remanded for a factual determination of this issue.73 It did not
rule on the constitutionality of the lot size restrictions, but its dis-
cussion limited the permissible use of lot size restrictions.7 4 Ber-
enson represents a shift from a local definition of "general welfare"
to a regional definition."3
The Berenson approach to applying the regional standard is the
most restrained of all the regional precedents to Livermore. The
New York Court of Appeals held that the local legislation will con-
stitutionally promote the general welfare only if two requirements
are met. The court cited Ramapo as authority for the first requi-
site: The local legislature must provide a properly balanced plan
for the community.7 6 It did not cite Ramapo for the second ele-
69. For a discussion of the Livermore balancing test, see text following
note 108 infra.
70. See note 61 supra.
71. See text accompanying notes 76 & 77 infra.
72. See note 38 supra.
73. 38 N.Y.2d at 105, 341 N.E.2d at 239, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
74. See note 75 infra.
75. Judge Jasen, who dissented three years earlier to the Ramapo deci-
sion, wrote the unanimous opinion in Berenson. No member of the Ramapo
majority participated in Berenson. The court observed that the traditional
test considered only the impact of an ordinance upon the local community,
and then held that the constitutional test must consider the impact upon the
region. The court pointed out that it will now actively consider "whether
... [the ordinance] is 'really designed to accomplish a legitimate public
purpose.'" Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 107, 341 N.E.2d
236, 240, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 678 (1975). The Livermore court used even
stronger language to describe the appropriate level of scrutiny. See note
93 and accompanying text infra. The Berenson court served notice that
only an isolated community may make even limited use of two-acre min-
imum lot size restrictions. The court observed that even Ramapo did not
purport to countenance exclusion.
76. 38 N.Y.2d at 109, 341 N.E.2d at 241, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
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ment: "[I]n enacting a zoning ordinance, consideration must be
given to regional needs and requirements."77 The court held that
when the judiciary considers whether the local legislature has
satisfied the second element, the court must balance the "local
desire to maintain the status quo within the community and the
greater public interest that the regional needs be met. 78
Collateral Approaches to the Regional Perspective
Three states have allowed exclusion of business from the com-
munity where adequate services may be readily obtained in nearby
communities.79 Florida courts have upheld the validity of exclu-
sionary zoning ordinances without any qualification."0
Many states have passed statutes that require some form of
regional control."' State zoning has not generally been adopted,
however. Existing state zoning plans usually involve either small
states or areas of special environmental concern, such as coastal or
77. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
78. Id.
79. Valley View Village v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955); Cadoux
v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 162 Conn. 425, 294 A.2d 582, cert. denied,
408 U.S. 924 (1972); McDermott v. Village of Calverton Park, 454 S.W.2d
577 (Mo. 1970).
80. Blank v. Town of Lake Clarke Shores, 161 So. 2d 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1964); Gautier v. Town of Jupiter Island, 142 So. 2d 321 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1962).
81. For a discussion of the various state statutes providing for regional
zoning, see R. HEALY, LAND USE AND THE STATES (1976). See also F. Bos-
SELMAN, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1972); Brown, A
Further Analysis of Judicial Review of Land Use Controls in Oregon, 12
WILIWAmETTE L. J. 45 (1975); Savage, The Adirondack Park Agency Act:
A Regional Land Use Plan Confronts "The Taking Issue," 40 ALBANY L.
REv. 447 (1976); Straniere, Land Use in New York: An Evaluation of
Policy and Performance, 40 ALBANY L. REV. 693 (1976); Walter, The Law
of the Land: Development Legislation in Maine and Vermont, 23 ME. L.
REV. 315 (1971); Winters, Environmentally Sensitive Land Use Regulations
in California, 10 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 693 (1973); Note, The Minnesota En-
vironmental Rights Act, 56 MqN. L. REV. 575 (1972); Note, State Land Use
Regulation-A Survey of Recent Legislative Approaches, 56 MINN. L. REV.
869 (1972); Comment, Saving the Seashore: Management Planning for the
Coastal Zone, 25 HAsT. L.J. 191 (1973).
The California Department of Housing and Community Development,
pursuant to the authority vested by CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 41134
(West Supp. 1977), to make specific CAL. Gov. CODE § 65302(c) (West Supp.
1976), proposes to adopt regulations CAL. Amv=. CODE, tit. 25, ch. 1, sub.
ch. 5. The proposed effective dates are: Nov. 1, 1978-Southern Calif.; Feb.
1, 1979-Bay Area; May 1, 1979-Sacramento Region. These regulations
would require that the housing element of a local legislature's general plan
provide for the community's "fair share" of the regional housing needs.
Letter from Mr. Arnold C. Sternberg, Director of the California Department
of Housing and Community Development, to "All Interested Persons," Jan.
31, 1977 (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
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beach locales.8 2 Landowners and local governments have stren-
uously opposed state zoning.8 3 Such problems and the magnitude
of the task suggest that widespread state zoning will not be forth-
coming.
THE Livermore DECISION
The residents of Livermore passed an initiative designed to deny
further residential growth until city facilities met specified stand-
ards. The plaintiff construction association sued to enjoin enforce-
ment of the initiative. The trial court invalidated the ordinance on
grounds not pertinent here.8 4 The decision on the merits was based
on the pleadings . 8
The California Supreme Court reversed the two trial holdings
and remanded" for trial of the remaining issue. That question is
whether the Livermore ordinance unconstitutionally exceeded the
scope of the police power.87 The court did not rule on that issue,
electing instead to "reaffirm" and "clarify" traditional zoning prin-
ciples.18 It would seem that these "traditional" zoning principles
will soon be tested in the appellate courts of California. 9
The Livermore court's majority and two dissenting opinions
reflected the court's ambivalence toward exclusionary zoning. The
82. R. HEALY, LAND USE AND THE STATES 149 (1976).
83. Id.
84. The trial court held, pursuant to the rule announced in Hurst v. City
of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929), that a zoning ordinance could
not be enacted by initiative, as this would deny to affected landowners the
due process elements of notice and opportunity to be heard. See Associated
Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal.
3d at 588, 557 P.2d at 475, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 43. The Livermore decision
overruled Hurst. 18 Cal. 3d at 596, 557 P.2d at 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
Also the trial court held the initiative unconstitutionally vague. Id.
85. The plaintiff zoning opponent filed suit to enjoin enforcement of the
ordinance. After the city filed its answer, all parties moved for judgment
on the pleadings and stipulated that the court could decide the merits on
the basis of the pleadings and other documents. Associated Home Builders
of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 590, 557
P.2d 473, 476, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 58 (1976).
86. Id. at 611, 557 P.2d at 490, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
87. Id. at 601, 557 P.2d at 483, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
88. Id. at 589, 557 P.2d at 476, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
89. In addition to the possibility that the instant parties will again seek
appellate review, another case of regional import is working itself through
the courts. Orange County Fair Housing Council v. City of Irvine, No.
225,824 (Super. Ct., filed Mar. 7, 1975).
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majority purported to adopt the regional perspective while re-
taining the rational relation standard of review.90 However, it
is arguable not only that the court has replaced both traditional
corollaries, but also that its rule is an extension of the regional
perspective trend. Mr. Justice Mosk dissented, arguing that any
absolute prohibition on housing development should be presump-
tively invalid. 91 He would follow the New Jersey approach.0 2
The court equivocated when it described the level of scrutiny to
be employed by a court reviewing local zoning legislation. On the
one hand, it set forth exacting criteria to be used in determining
reasonableness. 93 On the other hand, it said a court may defer to
local judgment.94 The court then said a court may not abdicate its
responsibility of review.95
The California court may not require exacting judicial review and
consistently uphold the Lockard v. City of Los Angeles"6 level of
scrutiny. Lockard calls for such a minimal level of scrutiny 7 as to
suggest that zoning ordinances will ordinarily withstand attack.
The Livermore court said that deference is not to be judicial abdica-
tion and that "we can no longer assume that an ordinance will
never be overturned."9 8 The shift in emphasis is so dramatic that
Livermore should be read as implicitly overruling Lockard, at least
where the local ordinance has a regional impact.
90. 18 Cal. 3d at 606, 557 P.2d at 486, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 54. See also text
accompanying note 88 supra.
91. Id. at 623, 557 P.2d at 497, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 65. Justice Clark
dissented. He would have invalidated the ordinance, arguing that its enact-
ment by initiative denies due process to affected landowners. Id. at 615,
557 P.2d at 492, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
92. The New Jersey approach is discussed in the text accompanying notes
56-57 supra.
93. The California court used aggressive language when it described the
reviewing court's role in assessing whether a regulation relates to the re-
gional general welfare. "[T]he court must ascertain," "must inquire,"
"must determine," must "identify the competing interests," must determine
the "probable impact," and must find a reasonable basis "in fact, not in
fancy." 18 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 557 P.2d at 488-89, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56-57.
"The ordinance must have a real and substantial relation to the general
welfare." Id. at 608-09, 557 P.2d at 488-89, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56-57. Compare
this language with the approach taken in Lockard v. City of Los Angeles,
33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 38 (1949). See note 11 supra.
94. This suggestion of deference is designed to avoid any inference that
the court's strong language denoted a strict scrutiny test. Interview with
Mr. C. Foster Knight, Deputy Attorney General, at the Attorney General's
office in San Diego, California (Feb. 18, 1977).
95. 18 Cal. 3d at 609, 557 P.2d at 489, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
96. See note 9 supra.
97. See note 11 supra.
98. 18 Cal. 3d at 609, 557 P.2d at 489, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
1242
[VOL. 14: 1227, 1977] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
The supreme court adopted the regional perspective of the "gen-
eral welfare," however, without equivocation. Thus, it adopted
both of the new corollaries of review: non-deference and a re-
gional perspective.
The Regional Test
Under the Livermore test, the plaintiff zoning opponent must
establish first that the local zoning legislation has a substantial
regional impact, and second, that the challenged restriction does not
reasonably relate to the regional welfare.99 The zoning opponent
has the burden of presenting this evidence of unconstitutionality. 10 0
If the effect of the ordinance is local, so is the definition of the
"general welfare" to be served.' 0 ' The judiciary will not demand
that the ordinance bear a reasonable relation to the welfare of the
region's citizens when the ordinance's impact is limited to the city
boundaries. However, even where the impact is local only, a court
will make an active inquiry into the effect of the ordinance. The
issue of the extent of the effect of the ordinance is a question of
fact to be determined by the trial court.
0 2
Livermore set out a three step analysis' 03 to be employed by a
court in determining whether the zoning opponent has proved that
the restriction does not reasonably relate to the regional welfare.
The first step is to forecast the probable effect and duration of the
restriction. When an ordinance posits a "total ban" on construction,
the court is to consider the extent of the current shortage of public
facilities and whether and when the city plans to rectify the short-
age. The local legislature must justify its exclusion and describe its
efforts to provide services. The supreme court assumed that the
99. Id. at 608, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
100. Id. at 609, 557 P.2d at 489, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 57. Compare this ap-
proach with that taken in Pennsylvania and New Jersey in certain circum-
stances where the plaintiff's unrebutted allegation will reverse the burden.
See note 58 supra.
101. 18 Cal. 3d at 607, 55 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
102. Id. at 607 n.24, 557 P.2d 487 n.24, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55 n.24. In Lock-
ard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 38 (1949), the supreme
court said that trial findings of fact are not binding on an appellate court.
The Livermore court did not similarly suggest that an appellate court may
review the credibility of evidence. However, it did find, sua sponte, that
the Livermore ordinance has, on its face, regional impact. 18 Cal. 3d at
607, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
103. 18 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 557 P.2d at 488-89, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56-57.
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local government has an obligation to provide services. However,
this obligation is not absolute.'0 4
"The second step is to identify the competing interests affected by
the restriction."'1 5 The court's reference to "competing interests"
suggests that there may be a variety of interests on each side. How-
ever, it identified these competing interests as environment and
housing. The court discussed environment in a broad sense to
include concerns for quiet seclusion as well as for clean air.100 Its
concern for both sides was demonstrated by its statement that "deep
social antagonisms"' 0 7 compete with one another.
Once a court has identified the competing interests, the third
step requires it to determine the net effect of the ordinance and
whether such effect represents a reasonable accommodation of the
interests. 08 This stage calls upon a court to balance the compet-
ing interests. A court must weigh the respective interests of en-
vironment and housing to determine which one dominates.
The Livermore court chose not to rule on the case before it,
preferring instead to remand to the trial court for further develop-
ment of the record. 0 9 It assumed that the city would endeavor
to provide facilities and that the housing ban would be temporary.
The plaintiff was invited to introduce evidence to the con-
104. Cities have an obligation to provide public services. See Robinson
v. City of Boulder, 547 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1976); Delmarva Enterprises v. City
of Dover, 301 A.2d 276 (Del. 1973); Reid Dev. Corp. v. Parsippany-Troy
Hills, 10 N.J. 289, 89 A.2d 667 (1952). This duty is not absolute, how-
ever. The local legislature may restrict sewer or water services in order
to avoid undue expense, to avert threatened shortages, or to aid in imple-
mentation of more systematic planning. Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington
Suburban Sanitation Comm'n, 400 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Md. 1975); Swanson
v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 56 Cal. App. 3d 512, 128 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1976);
Lawrence v. Richards, 111 Me. 95, 88 A. 92 (1913); Reid Dev. Corp. v. Par-
sippany-Troy Hills, 31 N.J. Super. 459, 107 A.2d 20 (1954); Golden v. Plan-
ning Bd. (Ramapo), 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). See also Barney's Furniture v. City of
Newark, 62 N.J. 456, 303 A.2d 76 (1973).
A school district might validly "require a property owner to dedicate
land, construct improvements, or pay fees as a condition to certification
[of a zoning change]." See Builders Ass'n of Santa Clara-Santa Cruz Coun-
ties v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 225, 232 n.6, 529 P.2d 582, 587 n.6, 118
CaL Rptr. 158, 163 n.6 (1974).
105. 18 Cal. 3d at 608, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
106. Id. at 608, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
107. Id. at 608, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56. The California
Supreme Court has been and remains concerned with the environment.
See Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633,
484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
108. 18 Cal. 3d at 609, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
109. Id. at 610, 557 P.2d at 489, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
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trary.11 The court called upon the plaintiff to substantiate his
allegation of an acute housing shortage in the San Francisco Bay
area. The City of Livermore was called upon to substantiate its
claim that problems of air pollution and inadequate public facilities
made it reasonable to divert new housing, at least temporarily.
The definition of the nature of the balance between environment
and housing awaits future litigation. However, the constitutional
parameters have been drawn. On the one hand, the local legislature
must, in good faith,"' present an environmental concern' 2 if it is
to successfully exclude outsiders. On the other hand, the court's
regional concern is for the regional housing demand.113
The court cited four cases, without any elaboration, to illustrate
the balancing process. 1 4 These cases offer the only clues to the
direction the court will take when it balances conflicts. Two of
the cases cited dealt with temporary building restrictions, and the
other two dealt with phased growth ordinances. The first decision,
Builders Association of Santa Clara-Santa Cruz v. Superior Court,"5
110. Id.
111. The Livermore court presumed that the Livermore municipality is
acting in good faith and will attempt to provide adequate school, sewage,
and water facilities. The zoning.opponent was invited to rebut this pre-
sumption. Id.
Problems of governmental bad faith have come up in several contexts.
The city of Palo Alto's open space classification was recently attacked. A
United States district court, after reviewing a substantial amount of evi-
dence tending to show bad faith by the city, found that the city's open space
restriction was not "bona fide" and that the city must pay for the condem-
nation. Arastra v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 963, 978 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
Upon stipulation the Arastra decision was vacated. 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D.
Cal. 1976). See Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal.
1974) (dealing with the same Palo Alto open space classification); Eld-
ridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1976).
See generally Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968) (plain-
tiffs land tied up for ten years); Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States,
424 F.2d 574 (Ct. C1. 1970) (federal government contemplated buying plain-
tiffs land for eight years thereby making it unsaleable).
112. The court cited Village of Belle Terre for the proposition that subur-
ban residents may validly seek "to secure 'the blessings of quiet seclusion
and clean air' and to 'make the area a sanctuary for people.'" 18 Cal. 3d
at 609, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
113. Id. at 609, 557 P.2d at 489, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56. This housing demand
has been the concern of the regional precedents. For example, in Board of
County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 661, 107 S.E.2d 390, 396 (1959),
the exclusionary purpose was found in the regional effect on housing
supply.
114. 18 Cal. 3d at 609 n.27, 557 P.2d at 489 n.27, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 57 n.27.
115. 13 Cal. 3d 225; 529 P.2d 582, 118 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1974).
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upheld a zoning moratorium of two years. The supreme court em-
phasized the temporary nature of the restriction. It also pointed
out that the trial court had found the ordinance in question had not
reduced the housing supply and that the plaintiff had not challenged
that finding. Thus, a valid city concern prevailed when there was
no reduction in the housing supply.
The second case, Metro Realty v. County of El Dorado,"" upheld
a temporary ordinance restricting the use of plaintiff's land while
the county contemplated a county-wide water development and
conservation plan. Again, this court was impressed with the tempo-
rary nature of the restriction.117 The Builders Association and
Metro cases dealt with the balancing of good faith restrictions
whose temporary effect imparted little loss to the region concerned.
Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma18 is the
third case. The Ninth Circuit's opinion is an anomaly as a precedent
for regional balancing. Whereas the court's opinion could have been
a precedent for balancing a good faith local concern against the
regional need for housing, its opinion instead represents a precedent
for deference to exclusion. 119 It held that a local legislature could
validly zone in its own self-interest even though its decision might
affect the "needs and resources of an entire region."' 120  The
Petaluma decision is consistent with the Lockard decision's level of
scrutiny,121 but contrasts sharply with the Livermore approach. 122
The Livermore citation of Petaluma may be taken as further evi-
dence of the supreme court's ambivalence toward the traditional
corollary of deference.
116. 222 Cal. App. 2d 508, 35 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1963).
117. Id. at 515, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 484. Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 1196 (1970)
collects cases dealing with the validity of interim zoning ordinances.
118. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
119. The circuit court noted that the Petaluma Plan reduced an explosive
annual growth rate of 12% to a more reasonable 6%. It also found that
the plan actually increased the availability of low income housing. Id.
at 900 & 902. Thus, it apparently did not agree with the trial court's finding
that the Petaluma Plan had an exclusionary purpose. Rather than deny
the trial court's finding (pursuant to Lockard, note 11 supra), the circuit
court chose to avoid that finding by deferring to the local legislature. To
support its position the court said it had earlier deferred-in Ybarra v. City
of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974)-to an ordinance that denied
housing to low income people. 522 F.2d at 907.
Thus, the circuit court was presented with the opportunity to balance a
local concern to-merely reduce growth against a regional need for housing.
Instead it purported to recognize and defer to an exclusionary purpose.
120. 522 F.2d at 908.
121. See note 11 supra.
122. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
1246
[VOL. 14: 1227, 1977] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
The fourth case is Ramapo,123 a New York Court of Appeals
decision. The New York court was reluctant to adopt the regional
standard. The Ramapo opinion recognized the regional concern, but
called upon the New York legislature to provide a regional reme-
dy.12 4 The Ramapo decision should be read in light of Berenson v.
Town of New Castle,125 because the latter decision reflected a con-
cern for balanced communities and regions. The resolution of the
contradictions in these four cases is commended to the ingenuity of
future litigants.
A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF Livermore
The Livermore "balancing test is conceptually mid-way between
deference and strict scrutiny.' 2  The reviewing court is to actively
consider the effect of the zoning restriction. It will not be enough
for the local legislature's proponent to allege an environmental
purpose. The reviewing court will look beyond the stated motives
and consider the actual effect of the local legislation.
The plaintiff challenged the Livermore ordinance on the ground
that it exceeded the municipality's authority under the police
power. 12 7 As authority for this proposition he cited several of the
regional precedents, but not the Berenson decision.128 The supreme
court refused to follow the cited precedents because they "all
involve ordinances which impede the ability of low and moderate
income persons to immigrate to a community but permit largely
unimpeded entry by wealthier persons.' 29 The court stated three
times that the plaintiff had not alleged any denial of equal protec-
tion on any basis, either wealth or migrant status.130  It is at least
arguable that the Livermore building ban affects low income fami-
lies disproportionately. 13 1
123. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S. 138 (1972).
124. See generally notes 31, 38, 61 & 75 supra.
125. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
126. Interview with Mr. C. Foster Knight, Deputy (Cal.) Attorney Gen-
eral, at the Attorney General's office in San Diego, California (Feb. 18,
1977).
127. 18 Cal. 3d at 601, 557 P.2d at 483, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
128. The plaintiff cited Mount Laurel, National Land, Appeal of Kit-
Mar, Appeal of Girsh, Carper, and Brstow (see notes 41-43 supra). 18 Cal.
3d at 606 n.23, 557 P.2d at 487 n.23, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55 n.23.
129. 18 Cal. 3d at 606, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
130. Id. at 600 n.18, 601, 602, 557 P.2d at 483 n.18, 483, 484, 135 Cal. Rptr.
at 51 n.18, 51, 52.
131. Wealthier individuals will not be denied housing in Livermore be-
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The court also purported not to follow the regional precedents
because it found them too aggressive in their review. The prece-
dents cited by the plaintiff did employ an aggressive review.13 2
However, the Livermore opinion is consistent with the substance of
the regional precedents, adopting a regional view of the "general
welfare" and declining to defer to the local judgment. 133 The dis-
tinction between Livermore and Mount Laurel lies in the level of
scrutiny each court accords to exclusionary zoning. The California
approach is mid-way between strict scrutiny and deference, whereas
New Jersey takes a strict view.134 The California level of scrutiny
is entirely consistent with the New York Berenson balancing
approach.135 Moreover, the Livermore decision may offer an ex-
tension of the regional concern.
Exclusion can be given a broad or narrow interpretation.
Some courts136 refer to an ordinance as exclusionary in the narrow
sense when its purpose or effect is to exclude particular classes of
persons from the community, such as low income groups, families
with school age children, racial minorities, or the poor. Growth
control plans are exclusionary in a broader sense when the public
at large is kept from immigrating to the barred community.
While the regional precedents 137 were concerned with the narrow
definition of exclusion, the facts in the Livermore case involved
the broader form of exclusion. The public at large was barred from
buying a residence in Livermore until city facilities met requisite
standards. 138 When the supreme court specified the regional inter-
est in housing, it referred to "the opportunity of people in general to
settle."13 9 Thus, it would seem' 40 that the regional interest is to be
cause they can afford to bid up the price of an existing house until the
owner agrees to sell; the lower income groups do not have this option.
It is also arguable that the building ban inflates the price of existing homes
beyond the ability to pay of low income groups. See text accompanying
notes 29 & 30 supra.
132. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
133. See text accompanying notes 93-98 supra.
134. For the California standard of review, see text accompanying note
126 supra. For the New Jersey standard of review, see notes 50-58 and
accompanying text supra.
135. For the Berenson balancing test, see text accompanying note 78
supra.
136. See, e.g., cases cited in note 24 supra.
137. See notes 41-44, supra.
138. See note 2 supra.
139. 18 Cal. 3d at 608, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
140. The Livermore court held that the indirect burden upon the
right to travel imposed by the Livermore ordinance does not call for
strict judicial scrutiny. The court found that "an ordinance which has the
effect of limiting migration to a community does not necessarily abridge
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broadly defined as housing in general, rather than merely housing
for low and middle income groups.
The California Supreme Court found the regional perspective of
the "general welfare" implicit in the police power. The local legis-
lature is acting pursuant to a state grant of authority, so the local
legislature must consider the welfare of the state's citizens.' 4 ' To
support its regional perspective, 142 the California Supreme Court
looked back over fifty years of zoning practice to reconsider lan-
a fundamental right to travel, and thus should not be examined by the com-
pelling interest standard unless it infringes some other fundamental right
or discriminates on a suspect basis." Id. at 604 n.22, 557 P.2d at 485 n.22,
135 Cal. Rptr. at 53 n.22. The court did not thereafter find any other funda-
mental right involved or any suspect discrimination. It is therefore argu-
able that the court is not interested in protecting a general interest in hous-
ing but is concerned only with low and moderate income housing. How-
ever, the court's stated concern for the opportunity of people in general
to settle and its denial of the right to travel argument are not inconsistent.
Both statements dealt with the interest of the public in migrating to the
community in question. The California court is constrained to support this
interest. However, its concern did not call for strict judicial scrutiny of
an ordinance that abridges this interest. Instead, it called for a middle
level of scrutiny.
The regional perspective is superior to the right-to-travel argument as
a device to test the validity of zoning legislation. The right-to-travel argu-
ment presents the narrow interest of an individual whereas the Livermore
regional standard is concerned with the ordinance's effect in general-that
is, on the public. The regional standard calls upon the courts to look beyond
the effect of the ordinance on the litigating parties to the effect on the
public at large. Thus, it is appropriate that the California Supreme Court
has adopted the regional standard as a device to test whether a regulation
complies with the "general welfare" requirement.
141. Id. at 608, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56. This is the same
analysis used in the Mount Laurel holding, a precedent that the California
Supreme Court cited after the court purported not to follow Mount Laurel.
142. Whereas the California Supreme Court may have difficulty breaking
with the traditional standard of deference, it has recognized the need for
a regional perspective since 1972. See Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal.
3d 541, 548, 492 P.2d 1137, 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749 (1972). See also
Town of Los Altos Hills v. Adobe Creek Properties, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 3d
488, 505-08, 108 Cal. Rptr. 271, 283-85 (1973) (the court described some of
the regional precedents from Pennsylvania and New Jersey, but declined
to make the instant case "the vehicle for pursuing such theories").
Recent court decisions also indicate a willingness to reconsider the re-
sponsibilities of local legislatures. Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community
v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 514, 522 P.2d 12, 16, 113 Cal. Rptr.
836, 840 (1974) (local variance boards must substantiate their decisions with
findings of fact). See also City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. City Council,
59 Cal. App. 3d 869, 883, 129 Cal. Rptr. 173, 179 (1976) (defined the distinc-
tion between zoning legislative and judicial functions).
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guage from Euclid that has lain dormant.143 The United States
Supreme Court did not "exclude the possibility of cases where the
general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the
municipality that the municipality would not be 'allowed to stand
in the way."'144
CONCLUSION
The regional perspective of the "general welfare" is an evolving
standard of review for zoning legislation. It avoids deference with-
out calling on the courts to become legislatures. A court applying
the regional standard need not exercise its judgment to determine
the specific allocation of land uses. Instead, it will examine the
reasonableness of the local regulation in light of its regional impact.
California's Livermore decision brings to five the number of state
courts that have adopted the regional standard. These states con-
tinue to follow the substance of the constitutional test enunciated by
Euclid and Miller v. Board of Public Works.145 It is the reversal of
the traditional corollaries that produces the regional standard. The
states employing the regional standard continue to require that
zoning legislation bear a reasonable relation to the "general wel-
fare." However, they have shifted their application of that con-
stitutional standard to accommodate fifty years of urban change.
Municipalities are no longer isolated islands.
These states vary substantially in their implementation of the
regional standard. One may postulate a continuum of review. The
traditional standard for zoning legislation, epitomized by Lockard,
applied minimal scrutiny. Virginia and Pennsylvania exert what
is nearly a strict scrutiny standard. New Jersey wields a tough
strict scrutiny application. California and New York employ a
middle level of scrutiny.
The New Jersey court addressed a state-wide pattern of exclusion
when it set forth its inflexible standard. When a court takes a
strict scrutiny approach, the municipality faces a burden that as a
143. The Mount Laurel decision also cited this language. 67 N.J. at 177,
336 A.2d at 726.
144. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926).
145. 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925). The United States Supreme Court
in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), in interpreting the
United States Constitution, adhered to the traditional rule of deference to
the local legislature in zoning matters. Thus, it is not surprising that two
subsequent regional cases, Mount Laurel and Livermore, base their regional
perspective in their respective state constitutions. See text accompanying
note 130 supra. The California Supreme Court recently held that since it
is not limited by the principle of federalism, it may review legislative acts
more aggressively than may the Supreme Court. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal.
3d 728, 766-67, 557 P.2d 929, 952, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 368 (1976).
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practical matter cannot be met.146 The strict scrutiny approach is
too inflexible. A constitutional standard should be able to survive
temporal and geographical changes. Constitutional interpretations
should not vary with the availability of federal funds. California
courts have not faced such extreme exclusion. The California
approach to exclusion is therefore more pliable.
The zoning opponent in California must establish a substantial
regional effect and an unreasonable burden on the region. Once
this is done, the local legislature must justify its exclusion. The
supreme court has indicated that it will be receptive to arguments
on both sides. The California regional standard is a flexible yard-
stick that accommodates varying environmental and housing needs.
The Livermore decision's three step analysis of reasonableness
gives a court a firm grip on the regional tool. Courts that have
been reluctant to exercise their judgments of local zoning are pro-
vided with specific guidelines. This analysis serves as a guide to
sharpen courts' inquiries into the reasonableness of an ordinance.
The task of resolving problems of exclusionary zoning is complex
and onerous. The California Supreme Court has now shouldered
that burden. Its rendition of the regional perspective refines the
standard and points the way for further evolution.
CURTIS A. RAnKiN
146. When a statute is subjected to strict scrutiny, only a compelling state
interest will satisfy the test. A compelling state interest has been found
only in rare circumstances. See, e.g., American Party of Texas v. White,
415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Korematsu v.
United States, 232 U.S. 214 (1944).
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